The Internet of Things (IoT) is developing towards smart and mobile Internet of Things (SM-IoT), which has made great progress. Due to the inherent heterogeneity, distribution, intensive communication, and resource constraints of SM-IoT, efficient security and privacy communication protocols become a particularly critical challenge. Signcryption has received considerable attention. Various signcryption schemes have been proposed to solve secure communication. However, most of them are low in efficiency, without the consideration of characteristics of the SM-IoT. In this paper, we propose a signcryption scheme to achieve efficient secure multi-message and multi-receiver communication for the heterogeneous and distributed SM-IoT. We develop Identity-based Cryptography (IBC) and Certificateless Cryptography (CLC) to solve the certificate management problem. Our scheme no longer needs wireless secure channel during key generation phase of traditional CLC system, which improves the applicability of our scheme in wireless SM-IoT environment. There is no expensive operations, such as bilinear pairing, in our scheme. In addition, our scheme outsources part of the verification overhead from the SM-IoT users to the gateway without revealing user privacy. The performance evaluation shows that the computation efficiency in both sender and receiver side is improved in our scheme.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet of Things (IoT) is emerging as an important part of the new generation of information technology [1] . The IoT aims to create an open global network connecting people, things and data, providing a ubiquitous interconnected mobile and smart sensor network for smart cities [2] . Security and privacy are always the crucial issues of IoT.
In order to protect the security and privacy of the IoT environment, extensive research on physical layer security [3] , systems enable cities aims to control traffic facilities and improve the efficiency. Smart medical systems can collect patients' data and help medical professionals to monitor the physical condition of patients in real time. At present, the demand for services based on SM-IoT is increasing and tending to diversify, such as medical services, weather forecasting, various resource management, environmental awareness and data acquisition. Because of the flattening of services, each authentication entity in SM-IoT can be a service sender. It makes the information and decentralized communication technology system face more and more network security threats [12] , since many services are related to users' sensitive information and private data.
In addition, it is noticeable that the number of IoT devices is growing dramatically. Cisco predicted that, by 2025, 500 billions devices will connect the Internet [15] . The SM-IoT allows them to interact with each other [16] . It indicates that there will be more intensive communication between people and things, things and things. The IoT system is usually deployed in a distributed environment. In a distributed environment, IoT entities exchange information dynamically to provide a decentralized and scalable infrastructure, to support billions of devices generating and exchanging large amount of data. Decentralized communication has become a crucial trend of SM-IoT, such as the researches on block-chain based mechanism [17] and device-to-device (D2D) communication technology. Meanwhile, we need more efficient secure schemes and mechanisms that can fulfill the heterogeneity and distribution of the SM-IoT environment. Among numerous cryptography methods, signcryption, a cryptography primitive can be applied to decentralized communication environment, has received considerable attention because of its high efficiency and security. Various efficient signcryption schemes have been proposed to achieve secure decentralized communication.
In this article, we consider the requirements to provide efficient personalized services for SM-IoT users, while ensuring security and privacy.
General multi-cast mechanism can only provide typical services through centralized approach, but can not provide personalized services for each user. Lacking of encryption and authentication mechanism makes SM-IoT devices more vulnerable to malicious attacks and threats. Multi-message and multi-receiver signcryption is an effective method to solve the problem. Multi-message and multi-receiver signcryption can complete the encryption and signature process of different messages sent to different receivers in one logical step. Receivers get customized messages that belongs to themselves, while other receivers can not decrypt them. It ensures both data privacy and communication security. At the same time, this method does not increase the cost of the SM-IoT receiver.
The challenging issues motivate us to design a scheme to complete secure communications from service sender of IBC system to the receivers of CLC system, which meets the needs of personalized multi-cast in the SM-IoT. In this paper, we propose a multi-message and multireceiver signcryption scheme for SM-IoT system, which can provide data privacy and communication security with higher efficiency. Our contributions can be summarized as follow:
1) We propose an efficient multi-message and multireceiver signcryption scheme, which is constructed based on ECC, employing scalar point multiplication operations rather than bilinear pairing. The calculation complexity of the scheme is relatively lower. 2) Our scheme is a heterogeneous communication scheme from the sender of IBC to receivers of CLC. It explores the PKG and the KGC to generate keys for users of IBC and CLC systems respectively. It is more practical in SM-IoT applications. 3) In order to reduce the SM-IoT receivers' computing overhead, we outsource part of the receivers' verification computation operations to the gateway, and verify the computation. Meanwhile, the gateway can not access the privacy information of the SM-IoT receivers. 4) Our scheme hides the partial private key for wireless network users of CLC system during the key generation process. A secure channel is no longer needed between the SM-IoT user and the KGC, which increases the security of the scheme. The structure of this paper is as follows: Section 2 reviews the related works. The security assumptions, network model, system model, and security model are described at Section 3 in detail, while Section 4 presents the proposed scheme. Correctness proof and security analysis of the proposed scheme are demonstrated in section 5. In section 6, we compare the function and performance between the proposed scheme and previous ones, and simulate the execution time of several schemes. A summary of this paper is made in Section 7.
In order to make the article easier to understand, TABLE 1 displays the abbreviations and notations used in this paper.
II. RELATED WORKS
In 1997, Zheng [18] fitst proposed the primitive of signcryption, which can complete signature and encryption in one single logical step. Initially, the schemes proposed by the researchers were based on public key infrastructure (PKI), e.g., schemes [19] , [20] . But PKI has the burden of certificate management, which requires both storage and time. Considering the certificate management burden, as early as 1984, Shamir [21] introduced the concept of identity-based cryptography (IBC) to solve this problem. In IBC system, the user's public key is calculated based on his/her identity information. Thus, IBC gets rid of the burden of certificate management.
In 2002, Malone-Lee [22] combined IBC and signcryption, and proposed identity-based signcryption (IBSC) scheme. Libert and Quisquater [23] proposed three IBSC schemes after pointing out the insecurity of Malone-Lee's scheme. In 2003, Chow et al. [24] proposed a IBSC scheme which can provide both public verifiability and forward security. And Boyen [25] proposed a IBSC scheme with public verifiability, forward security, and anonymity. Li and Khan [26] made a survey, and summarized the future research trend of IBSC, including designing and constructing new and efficient IBSC schemes with special properties in the standard model, constructing postquantum signcryption, and finding new applications for IBSC. IBSC has great advantage in computation and communication overhead, researchers have applied it to the Internet of Things. In 2017, Karati et al. [27] presented an IBSC scheme for Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) environment. However, the IBSC has the problem of excessive dependence on PKG, which is inherent in identity-based encryption system, because it needs the PKG to generate the user's full private key. Once the PKG is attacked, the system security will be greatly effected or even be destroyed.
In 2003, Al-Riyami and Peterson [28] proposed the concept of certificateless public key cryptography (CL-PKC), which changes the way the user's public and private keys were generated. The user generates a secret value, and combines it with the partial private key generated by the KGC to obtain full private key. Therefore, the key escrow problem is addressed by CL-PKC. In 2008, Barbosa and Farshim [29] researched the Certificateless Signcryption System (CLSC) and proposed the first certificateless signcryption scheme. However, their scheme requires six pairing operations during signcrypt and designcrypt phase which is low in efficiency. Wu and Chen [30] proposed a new CLSC scheme which needs four pairing operations, and Sharmila et al. [31] analyzed that their scheme was insecure. Then, in 2010, Liu et al. [32] proposed a novel scheme which is secure in the standard model, but their scheme needs five pairing operations. Xie and Zhang [33] proposed a new certificateless scheme which only needs two pairings. Thus, their scheme is more efficient than other CLSC schemes proposed before. However, all of these schemes employed bilinear pairing operations, whose efficiency is much lower than that of scalar multiplication over the elliptic curve group. In 2009, Sharmila et al. [34] proposed the first CLSC scheme without bilinear pairing and prove it in the random oracle model. Henceforth, Certificateless signcryption tends to be more lightweight. In 2010, Xie and Zhang [35] proposed a pairing-free CLSC scheme, which is more efficient than all previous constructions. Since then, many CLSC schemes without bilinear pairing have been proposed (e.g., [36] - [38] ). Researchers put forward many CLSC schemes combined with the different mechanisms and other technologies, which are suitable for various environments. In 2017, Li et al. [39] proposed a certificateless signcryption scheme which achieves the public verifiability, ciphertext authenticity as well as insider security. And they designed an access control scheme based on the proposed certificateless signcryption scheme. References [38] and [40] combine the characteristics of the IoT environment, improve the efficiency of CLSC signcryption, and make it suitable for the application of IoT safely and effectively.
Furthermore, the schemes above are constructed for oneto-one communication, which is unable to meet the growing demand for multicast communication. There are schemes provide the sender with the function that send one message to different receivers. In 2006, the first multi-receiver signcryption scheme based on IBC was proposed by Duan and Cao [41] . Schemes [42] , [43] are constructed based on identity-based signcryption, which ensure the anonymity of receivers. Hung et al. [44] , Islam et al. [45] , and Pang et al. [46] proposed multi-receiver certificateless signcryption schemes respectively.
In the SM-IoT environment we consider, there are demands of sending personalized services and customized messages, which means we need to send different messages to different receivers at a time. The SM-IoT has raised the requirement for secure multi-message and multi-receiver communication services. The concept of multi-receiver and multi-message signcryption was first proposed by Seo and Kim [47] in 1999. They construct a multi-message and multi-receiver domain authentication signcryption scheme. Users in the authentication domain can verify the validity of the message and decrypt it to get their own. Elkamchouchi and Hagras [48] proposed a multi-message and multi-receiver signcryption scheme based on ECC which reduced the computational overhead. Kumar and Ansari [49] proposed a scheme which supports public verifiability in 2013. But it is regretful that their scheme uses time-consuming modular exponentiation operations. And in 2019, Pang et al. [50] constructed a certificateless signcryption scheme based on ECC, which is efficient and ensures the anonymity of receivers. However, because of the complexity of communication environment, different communication terminals may be in different security cryptography environment, which means that we need to consider signcryption schemes for heterogeneous systems. This situation is more common in the SM-IoT environment. In order to adapt to the heterogeneity of the SM-IoT, heterogeneous signcryption schemes have received great attention. In 2010, Sun and Li [51] proposed the multi-receiver signcryption scheme for secure communication between IBC and PKI. Huang et al. [52] proposed a heterogeneous scheme that allows the sender in the IBC system to send a message to the receiver in the PKI system, and scheme [53] was constructed based on CLC and PKI. Obviously, these schemes generally have the problem of certificate management overhead, because they are constructed based on PKI. Li et al. [54] and Niu et al. [55] proposed a multi-receiver signcryption scheme between IBC and CLC respectively, but their schemes employ bilinear pairing operation, which makes their scheme low inefficient.
III. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we briefly review the definition of security assumption, and then give the network model, general model and security model of the scheme.
A. SECURITY ASSUMPTIONS
Assuming p is a large integer prime, and G is an addition cyclic group of points on ECC with order p, P is a generator of G, Z * p is a nonzero multiplicative group based on p. We define the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP) and Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem (CDHP) as follow:
1) ECDLP
Given two elements P, Q ∈ G, and Q = aP, where a ∈ Z * p , computing a is called ECDLP.
Definition 1: The probability advantage of extracting ECDLP by any probability polynomial time (PPT) adversary A defined as follow is negligible.
Definition 2: The probability advantage of extracting CDHP by any PPT adversary A defined as follow is negligible.
As shown in Fig. 1 , our network model contains four entities, the Trusted Service Provider, including the KGC for CLC and the PKG for IBC, Resource Senders of IBC system, receivers of CLC system and the gateway. We assume the PKG and KGC are fully trusted, and the gateway is honest but curious, which means that the gateway honestly follows the scheme, but is curious to decrypt the ciphertext. The sender needs to be authorized by the PKG. The PKG generates a private key for the sender of the IBC system, and the KGC generates partial private keys for receivers of the CLC system. Then, the sender signcrypts messages and transmits the signcryption ciphertext to the gateway. The gateway computes the signcryption verification parameter, and transfers it with ciphertext to receivers. Only the designated receivers can correctly verify the parameter and signature, and then decrypt the corresponding signcryption ciphertext. This model supplies an efficient and secure oneto-many decentralized communication for heterogeneous SM-IoT.
C. GENERAL MODEL
The general model of our scheme is composed of four main algorithms [39] , [55] , Setup Algorithm, Key Extraction Algorithm, Signcryption Algorithm, Designcryption Algorithm, described as follow.
1) SETUP ALGORITHM
With security parameter λ as input, the PKG runs the PKG setup algorithm and KGC runs the KGC setup algorithm to generate their master keys and system public keys, and keep master key secret respectively. Then, the Trusted Service Provider publishes the public parameter param.
2) KEY EXTRACTION ALGORITHM

This algorithm is divided into Identity-Based Cryptography Key Generation(IBC-KG) algorithm and Certificateless Cryptography Key Generation(CLC-KG) algorithm as follow:
IBC-KG. This algorithm runs by PKG of the IBC system. The sender sends his identity ID s to the PKG. The PKG generates corresponding private key SK s for the sender and returns back through secure channel.
CLC-KG. The algorithm runs by KGC and users of the CLC system.
1) Set Secret Value Algorithm:
The receiver of CLC system runs this algorithm to generate a secret value x i , which is used to construct his full private key and the corresponding public key parameter X i . 2) Extract Partial Private Key Algorithm: The algorithm runs by the KGC of CLC system. With ID i and X i as inputs, the KGC generates corresponding partial private key d i hiding in u i , and public key parameter T i , then transmits (u i , T i ) through public channel. 3) Set Public Key Algorithm: The algorithm runs by the receiver. With T i and public key parameter X i as inputs, user generates his public key PK i . Then, the user sends PK i to the KGC for publication. 4) Set Full Private Key Algorithm: The algorithm runs by the receiver. After obtaining partial private key d i from u i , with secret value x i as input, the user generates his/her full private key SK i .
3) SIGNCRYPTION ALGORITHM
This algorithm runs by the sender of IBC system. Taken sender's private key SK s and system public parameter param, a set of receivers' PK i and the messages M = {m i |i = 1, 2, . . . , n} as inputs, the algorithm returns the full signcryption ciphertext σ .
4) DESIGNCRYPTION ALGORITHM
With ciphertext σ , the gateway computes the signcryption verification parameter and transmits to receivers. With the public key of sender and the private key of receiver SK i as inputs, the receiver verifies the parameter, and then runs Designcryption algorithm to verify and recover his plaintext message m i .
D. SECURITY MODELS
This subsection defines the security model [46] , [56] , [57] of the proposed scheme under random oracal. The confidentiality of the proposed scheme is defined based on the concept of indistinguishable against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA2), considering two types of adversary. A Type I adversary A I is a dishonest user, who can not know the master key of KGC but has the right to replace any user's public key. A Type II adversary A II is a curious but honest KGC, who knows the master key but does not have the authorize to replace user's public key. The authorization is defined based on the concept of existential unforgeability against adaptive chosen message attacks (EUF-CMA).
1) GAME 1: CONFIDENTIALITY WITH ADVERSARY A I
Game 1 is defined to meet IND-CCA2 against A I . The game is an interaction between the challenger C and the adversary A I under IND-CCA2. is an IBC-CLC multi-message and multi-receiver signcryption algorithm. The game is shown as follows. Setup: Given security parameter λ, challenger C runs the Setup Algorithm, generates system public parameter param, sends to adversary A I , but keeps KGC's master key s 2 secret. And A I chooses a set of target identities I = {ID i |i = 1, 2, . . . , n}.
Phase 1: A 1 makes polynomial bounded number of queries to C.
1) Partial private key query: A I chooses an ID j / ∈ I and sends to C. C runs the Extract Partial Private Key Algorithm to generate corresponding partial private key and then sends it back to A I . 2) Secret value query: A I sends ID j to the challenger C. C runs the CLC-KG Algorithm to get secret value of user. 3) Public key query: A I queries for the public key of ID j , and C runs Set Public Key Algorithm and returns the result to the adversary. 4) Replace public key: The adversary may replace the public key of any user. 5) Signcryption query: With the public key sender ID s , receivers I * = {ID j |j = 1, 2, . . . , n, j = i}, the adversary A I queries for signcryption of message set M = {m 1 , m 2 , . . . , m n }. The challenger C runs the Signcryption Algorithm to generate corresponding signcryption ciphertext σ and returns it back to A I . 6) Designcryption query: The adversary A I submits a signcryption ciphertext σ under sender ID s , receivers I * = {ID j |j = 1, 2, . . . , n, j = i}. C runs the Designcryption Algorithm to compute the result and then sends back to A I . Challenge: A I chooses two plaintext M 0 , M 1 , and ID s , ID i ∈ I , A I is not allowed to query the partial private key of ID i in Phase 1. Then, C selects β ∈ 0, 1, and runs the Signcryption Algorithm and generates corresponding ciphertext σ * to send back to A I . Phase 2: A I can query as Phase 1, but can not query partial private key of any receiver whose ID i ∈ I , or private key of receivers whose public key has been replaced, and not query for the designcryption of σ * .
Guess: A I produces a bit β . If β = β, then A I wins the game. The advantage of A I is defined as follow:
Definition 3: If the probability advantage of A I to win Game 1 meets that Adv IND−CCA 2 (A I ) ≤ ε within PPT τ , where ε is the non-negligible advantage. Then we said algorithm is IND-CCA2-I secure.
2) GAME 2: CONFIDENTIALITY WITH ADVERSARY A II Game 2 is defined to meet IND-CCA2 against A II . The game is an interaction between the challenger C and the adversary A II under IND-CCA2. is an IBC-CLC multi-message and multi-receiver signcryption algorithm. The game is shown as follows.
Setup: Given security parameter λ, challenger C setup as in Game 1, but sends param, and master keys s 1 , s 2 to adversary A II . The adversary A II chooses a set of target receivers I = {ID i |i = 1, 2, . . . , n}.
Phase 1: The adversary A II can make polynomial bounded number of queries as in Phase 1 of Game 1. The challenger C makes corresponding responds.
Challenge: A II chooses two plaintext M 0 , M 1 , and ID s , ID i ∈ I , then submits to C. A II is not allowed to make Secret Key query of ID i ∈ I in Phase 1. The challenger runs Signcryption Algorithm to generate corresponding ciphertext σ * , and returns to A II .
Phase 2: A II performs the queries as in Phase 1, except Secret value query of ID i ∈ I , private key query of receivers whose public key has been replaced, and Designcryption query of σ * .
Guess: The adversary A II produces a bit β . If β = β, A II wins the game. And the advantage of A II is defined as follow:
Definition 4: If the probability advantage of A II to win Game 2 meets that Adv IND−CCA 2 (A II ) ≤ ε within PPT τ , where ε is the non-negligible advantage. Then we say the algorithm is IND-CCA2-II secure.
3) GAME 3: UNFORGEABILITY Game 3 is defined to meet EUF-CMA against the forger F. The game is an interaction between the challenger C and the forger F under EUF-CMA. is a IBC-CLC multi-message and multi-receiver signcryption algorithm. The game is shown as follows. Setup: Given security parameter λ, challenger C runs the Setup Algorithm to generate public parameter param, and master keys. Then sends the param to the forger F, and keeps master key of PKG secret. F chooses a target identity ID s .
Attack: F makes polynomial queries as follows.
1) Private key query: F submits an ID s = ID s to challenger C. C runs the IBC_KG Algorithm to generate corresponding private key of ID s and returns it back to F. 2) Signcryption query: F submits ID s , ID i (i = 1, 2, . . . , n), and message M . C runs the Signcryption Algorithm to generate corresponding ciphertext σ and return it back to F.
Forgery: F produces a σ with sender's identity ID s , whose private key SK s has never been queried. F wins if the Designcryption do not return a ⊥.
Definition 5: An algorithm is EUF-CMA secure, if there is no PPT adversary which can win Game 3 with non-negligible advantage.
IV. PROPOSED SCHEME
This section illustrates our signcryption scheme in detail. The proposed scheme involves four participants: KGC, PKG, sender ID s , and n authorized receivers with identities ID 1 , ID 2 , . . . , ID n . The four algorithms described as follow:
With a security parameter λ as input, system randomly selects a prime p (q ≥ p k , k is a long integer.), and generates an ecliptic curve E defined on finite filed F p . Then, chooses an additive group G on E and its generator P with order p. Because of the heterogeneity of SM-IoT environment, we use the PKG and the KGC to generate keys for users in different cryptography systems respectively.
1) PKG SETUP
Randomly chooses an integer s 1 ∈Z * p where s 1 is the master key that only PKG knows, and one hash function: H 0 :
Then, computes P 1 = s 1 P, and P 1 is the public key of PKG.
2) KGC SETUP
Randomly chooses an integer s 2 ∈Z * p as the master key, and computes P 2 = s 2 P as KGC's public key. Then, defines five hash functions as follow:
Chooses symmetric encryption/decryption function as Enc ρ /Dec ρ . ρ is a symmetric key.
Then, publishes the system's public parameter param = E, G, p, P, P 1 , P 2 , H 0 , H 1 , H 2 , H 3 , H 4 , H 5 , Enc ρ , Dec ρ , and keep master keys s 1 , s 2 secret respectively.
B. KEY EXTRACTION ALGORITHM
This algorithm is divided into IBC-KG Algorithm and CLC-KG Algorithm for the sender and the receivers respectively.
1) IBC-KG ALGORITHM
Sender transmits his ID s to PKG. PKG randomly selects an integer t s ∈Z * p , computes T s = t s P, and d s = t s + s 1 h s (mod p), where h s = H 0 (I D s , T s , P 1 ). Finally, returns SK s = (T s , d s ) back via secure channel.
2) CLC-KG ALGORITHM Receivers of CLC system obtain their partial private keys, generate their full private keys and public keys as follow:
Set Secret Value Algorithm: Receiver R i with identity ID i randomly selects an integer x i ∈Z * p , and computes X i = x i P, then sends (ID i , X i ) to the KGC.
Set Partial Private Key Algorithm: Upon receiving ID i and X i , KGC randomly chooses an integer t i ∈Z * p , compute T i = t i P, and
Set Public Key Algorithm: Upon receiving T i and u i from KGC, the receiver checks the equation:
if the equation holds, the receiver accepts T i and u i , and sets PK i = h −1 i (T i + X i ) as his public key, and sends PK i to KGC for publication. Otherwise, the receiver rejects T i and u i .
Set Full Private Key Algorithm: The receiver of the SM-IoT environment obtain
Then, sets SK i = (x i , d i ) as his full private key.
C. SIGNCRYPTION ALGORITHM
With the private key SK s of sender, the public parameter param, the receiver's identity ID i and public key PK i (i = 1, 2, . . . , n) as input, the sender in IBC system runs the algorithm as follow: 1) Randomly chooses two integers r 1 , r 2 ∈Z * p , and computes R 1 = r 1 P, R 2 = r 2 P. 2) Computes U i = r 1 h i (PK i + P 2 ) and γ i = H 2 (I D s , I D i , U i , R 1 ), for each receiver. 3) Computes c i = m i ⊕ H 3 (γ i ), and constructs C = {H 4 (γ 1 , R 1 )||c 1 , γ 2 , R 1 )||c 2 , . . . , H 4 (γ n , R 1 )||c n }. 4) Randomly chooses θ ∈ Z * p . Then, computes
a i ∈ Z * p , and sets A = {a i |i = 0, . . . , n − 1}.
5)
Computes h = H 5 (I D s , R 1 , R 2 , C, θ, a 0 , . . . , a n−1 ), ρ = H 3 (θ) and S = Enc (ρ) (C). 6) Computes ν = (hr 2 + d s ) −1 r 1 (modp). Finally, the sender sets σ = (S, R 2 , ν, h, A) as signcryption ciphertext and broadcasts it to the SM-IoT receivers of CLC system through communication channel.
D. DESIGNCRYPTION ALGORITHM
Given σ = (S, R 2 , ν, h, A), and receiver's private key, Designcryption Algorithm runs as follow:
First, the gateway obtain the sender's key T s and performs as follow.
1) Computes
where h s = H 0 (I D s , T s , P 1 ). 2) Constructs the ciphertext σ 1 = (σ, R 1 ) and sends it to receivers. Designcryption: This algorithm runs by SM-IoT receivers of CLC system, with ciphertext σ 1 as input.
, and obtain h = H 5 (I D s , R 1 , R 2 , C , θ , a 0 , . . . , a n−1 ). Then, checks if h = h. If yes, continue to decrypt. Otherwise, output false symbol ⊥ and aborts. 4) Computes α i = H 4 (γ i , R 1 ), and then searches corresponding H 4 (γ i , R 1 )||c i in C through α i . 5) If there is no equation satisfies that α i = H 4 (γ i , R 1 ) during the search process, aborts and returns ⊥. Otherwise, recovers message m i = c i ⊕ H 3 (γ i ) and accept it.
V. CORRECTNESS PROOF AND SECURITY ANALYSIS A. CORRECTNESS PROOFS
This is the correctness proof of our scheme. Theorem 1: The verification of SM-IoT receiver's partial private key in Key Extraction Algorithm is correct.
Proof: Eqn. (5) u i P = T i + h i P 2 + H 1 (ID i , x i P 2 , T i )P guarantees the correctness of the partial private key, because:
It can be seen from the above derivation process that the equation u i P = T i +h i P 2 +H 1 (ID i , x i P 2 , T i )P holds, so it can be proved that our partial private key verification is correct.
Theorem 2: The computation of R 1 in Designcryption Algorithm is correct.
Proof: The derivation process of signature verification is guaranteed by the equation h = h , and the correctness of R 1 is required. R 1 is calculated as follow:
Theorem 3:
Proof:
Theorem 4: The verification of h = h is correct by authorized receiver.
Proof: Receivers get the correct R 1 , U i proved in Theorem 2 and Theorem 3, and then get γ i = γ i , and only the designated receivers can obtain correct ρ = ρ. Then, the receiver uses ρ to decrypt S to get correct C , and computes h = H 5 (I D s , R 1 , R 2 , C , θ , a 0 , . . . , a n−1 ). It is obvious that the equation h = h holds, since R 1 = R 1 and C = C.
B. SECURITY ANALYSIS
We analyze the security of this efficient signcryption scheme based on the security model defined in Section 3. The message confidentiality depends on the establishment of Theorem 5 and Theorem 6, which follow Game 1 and Game 2 defined in Subsection D of Section 3 respectively. The unforgeability depends on the establishment of the Theorem 7 which follows Game 3.
1) CONFIDENTIALITY
Theorem 5: The proposed scheme is IND-CCA2-I secure under the random oracle model, with the assumption that the CDHP is difficult.
Lemma 1: In the random oracle, if there is an adversary A I wins the Game 1 with non-negligible advantage ε, the CDHP can be solved by the challenger C, with non-negligible advan-
where τ pm denotes the time to calculate a scalar point multiplication on ECC. The adversary A I can make at least q H i times of H i query, q s times of signcryption query, q d times of designcryption query, q sv times of secret value query, q ppk times of partial private key query, and q pk times of public key query.
Proof: Assume that the adversary A I attacks IND-CCA2-I security of the proposed scheme. With a tuple P, aP, bP , C interacts with A I and hopes to solve CDHP. 1) Setup: Challenger C sets P 2 = aP, and provides public parameter to adversary A I . A I chooses target identities I = {ID i |i = 1, 2, . . . , n}.
2) Phase 1: C keeps lists L H i of H i (i = 0, 1, . . . , 5), and L PK of keys. a) H i (i = 0, 1, . . . , 5) query (q H i ): After receiving the H i query, C checks if the corresponding tuple exists in the list L H i . If yes, challenger C retrieves and returns it to adversary A I . Otherwise, challenger C randomly chooses an integer as result, returns to A I , and stores in list L H i . b) Key-query: If the tuple ID j , x j , d j , PK j exists in the L PK , gets the tuple. Otherwise:
• If ID j ∈ I , randomly chooses integer x j ∈ Z * p , sets d j = ⊥, returns SK j = (x j , ⊥).
• If ID j / ∈ I , randomly chooses integers x j , t j , h j ∈ Z * p , sets d j = t j + ah j modp. Then, sets PK j = h −1 j (X j + T j ), where X j = x j P, T j = t j P, updates h j to L H 1 . c) Partial private key query (q ppk ): With input ID j , if ID j ∈ I , C aborts. Otherwise, if ID j exists in L PK , returns d j ; if not, performs Key-query and returns d j . d) Secret value query (q sv ): If the input ID j ∈ I , C returns ⊥ and aborts. Otherwise, if exists in L PK , C returns SK j = (x j , d j ); if not, C performs Key-query and returns SK j . If the public key of ID j has been replaced, sets d j = ⊥. e) Public key query (q pk ): Challenger C checks if the tuple of ID j exists in L PK . If yes, returns PK j to the adversary A I . Otherwise, performs Key-query, then returns PK j and updates the key list L PK . f) Replace public key Replaces the public key of ID j with PK j , and sets d j = ⊥. 1, . . . , n) to the challenger C. C aborts if ID i / ∈ I . Otherwise, C chooses a bit β ∈ {0, 1}, and computes R 1 = bP, U i = bh i (PK i + P 2 ), randomly chooses γ * i , r * 2 , ν * , θ * ∈ Z * p . Then, computes R * 2 = r * 2 P, and generates the ciphertext as
modp) to calculate A = {a i |i = 0, . . . , n − 1}. Computes ρ * = H 3 (θ * ), and S β = Enc ρ * (C β ), h * = H 5 (ID s , R 1 , R * 2 , C β , θ * , a 0 , . . . , a n−1 ). Finally, challenger C returns a ciphertext σ * = (S β , R * 2 , ν * , h * , A).
4) Phase 2:
A I performs a series of query as in Phase 1, except the query for the private key of target identities whose public key has been replaced, the partial private key of target identities, or the designcryption query for σ * . 5) Guess: The adversary A I outputs a bit β according to the phases performed above. If β = β, then A I wins this game, and the challenger outputs abP = U i h −1 i − R 1 as the solution to CDHP. Otherwise, C aborts and outputs ⊥.
From the discussion above, the conclusion that the advantage of the challenger C sovling the CDHP is analyzed as follow. The probability of adversary A I failing in signcryption query is
, and the probability of C rejecting a valid ciphertext during designcryption query is q d 2 k . Therefore, the total advantage of challenger C to solve CDHP is ε ≥
The proposed scheme is IND-CCA2-II secure with the assumption that the CDHP is difficult.
Lemma 2: If the adversary A II wins the Game 2 with nonnegligible advantage ε, (A II can query at most q sv times of secret value, q ppk times of partial private key, q H i times of H i query, q s times of signcryption query, and q d times of designcryption query), the CDHP can be solved by the simulator C, with non-negligible advantage ε ≥ ε − q H 2 q d 2 k . Proof: Assume that the adversary A II attacks IND-CCA2-II security of the scheme. 1)Setup: Challenger C sets P 2 = s 2 P, sends system public parameter to A II . Adversary A II chooses target identities I = {ID i |i = 1, 2, . . . , n}.
2) Phase 1: Challenger C keeps the lists L H i of H i query results and L PK of key query results. A II makes polynomial bounded number of query as follow. If yes, C retrieves the result. Otherwise:
Then, sets SK j = (x j , d j ), computes d j = t j + s 2 h j mod p, PK j = h j −1 (T j + X j ), where T j = t j P, X j = x j P. c) Public key query (q pk ): Upon receiving ID j , challenger C checks if the corresponding tuple exists in L PK , and retrieves public key and returns back if yes. Otherwise C makes a key query to obtain the corresponding public key. d) Secret value query (q sv ): Upon receiving ID j , challenger C checks if ID j ∈ I . If yes, then returns ⊥ and aborts. If not, C retrieves the result x j from L PK , or performs key query to obtain x j , and then returns it to the adversary A II . e) Partial private key query (q ppk ): If the tuple of ID j exists in list L PK , challengerC retrieves the corresponding partial private key from L PK . Otherwise, c performs key query to get the answer.
f) Signcryption query (q s ):
With ID s , ID j (ID j / ∈ I ), and message M as inputs, challenger C runs Signcryption Algorithm to generate corresponding signcryption ciphertext σ . g) Designcryption query (q d ): Adversary A II performs the designcryption query with ID s , ID j (ID j / ∈ I ), and cipher-text σ as inputs. The challenger C runs the Designcryption Algorithm to obtain the plaintext, and then returns the result.
3) Challenge: The adversary A II submits two plaintexts M 0 , M 1 (M β = {m β i |i = 1, . . . , n}) with equal length, and ID s ,
and computes R * 2 = r * 2 P, h * and A = {a i |i = 0, . . . , n − 1}. Then, challenger generates the ciphertext as C β , ρ * = H 3 (θ * ), and S β = Enc ρ * (C β ). Finally, C returns a signcryption ciphertext σ * = (S β , R * 2 , ν * , h * , A). 4) Phase 2: The adversary A II performs queries as in Phase 1, except secret key query of any target identity, private key query of receivers whose public key has been replaced and the designcryption query of target signcryption ciphertext σ * . 5) Guess: A II outputs a bit β according to the phases performed above. If β = β, then A II wins the game, and the challenger outputs abP = U i − R 1 as the solution to CDHP. Otherwise, challenger C outputs ⊥ and aborts.
Through the interaction with A II , the probability advantage of challenger C breaking CDHP within τ ≤ τ +O(nq s +q pk
2) UNFORGEABILITY
Theorem 7: The proposed scheme is EUF-CMA secure with the assumption that the ECDLP is difficult. Lemma 3: If the forger F wins the Game 3 with nonnegligible advantage ε, the ECDLP can be solved by the challenger C, with non-negligible advantage ε .
Proof: C looks forward to solving this answer through the interaction with forger F. 1) Setup: C runs the algorithm to generate system public parameter, sets P 1 = s 1 P and sends param and KGC's master key s 2 to F. F chooses a target identity ID s .
2) Attack: Forger F performs a series of queries as follow. 3) Forgery: If F is an efficient forger, then by forking lemma [60] , F' can forge two signcryption ciphertext σ = (S , R 2 , ν , h , A ), σ * = (S , R * 2 , ν * , h * , A * ). We can combine the two equations,
. Then, the algorithm outputs a = (h * −h )r 2 ν −ν * . Thus the ECDLP can be solved within time τ ≤ 120686q s τ/ε, and the advantage of F forges a signature in time τ is ε ≥ 10(q s + 1)(q s + q H 5 )/2 k , the derivations is similar to Barreto et al. [56] .
VI. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS AND FUNCTIONAL COMPARISON
This section illustrates the advantages of the proposed scheme through making a comparison of functions and computational efficiency between the proposed scheme and the existing ones [27] , [39] - [52] , [44] - [55] , [58] , [59] , because these schemes have similar functions as ours. We implement a series of tests of [44] , [50] , [55] , [58] , as well as corresponding figure, which is intended to show the performance comparison results more intuitively.
A. COMPARISON OF FUNCTIONS
We compare functions of our scheme and schemes [27] , [39] - [52] , [44] - [55] , [58] , [59] . The results is shown in Table 2 . There are four schemes [51] , [52] , [55] , [59] consider the heterogeneity of SM-IoT. However, [51] , [52] , [59] have the burden of certificate management, because they are constructed based on PKI. Therefore, they are not suitable for the SM-IoT. Reference [39] takes the public verifiability into consideration, which shifts most computational cost of designcrypt from the SM-IoT receiver to the gateway. But this scheme not consider the heterogeneity, which limits its application in the SM-IoT environment.
Multi-receiver and multi-message scheme are satisfied by schemes [44] , [50] , [55] , [59] , and there are four schemes [45] , [51] , [52] , [58] only meet multi-receiver function. However, as we can see, schemes [27] , [39] - [52] , [44] , [55] , [59] are constructed based on bilinear pairing, which is an expensive operation for the SM-IoT environment.
Through hiding the SM-IoT receiver's partial private key of CLC system during key generation phase, our scheme no longer need wireless secure channel to transmit partial private key. Therefore, our scheme is more suitable for wireless SM-IoT environment.
Through the comparison and analysis above, it is obvious that compared with these schemes, our scheme meets all the functions mentioned in Table 2 , including heterogeneity, multi-message and multi-receiver, pairing free, and no requirement for wireless secure channel. The proposed scheme transmits part of computational overhead to the gateway through outsourcing, meets the heterogeneity feature of the SM-IoT by constructing the scheme based on IBC and CLC, and improves the efficiency of encryption and decryption by using scalar point multiplication on ECC instead of bilinear pairing. Therefore, our scheme has higher efficiency, and is more practical for application in the SM-IoT environment.
B. COMPARISON AND ANALYSIS OF PERFORMANCE
In this subsection, to have better understanding the Table 3 , we define notations to denote computational complexity of different mathematical operations, and give the descriptions of their definition in Table 2 . In order to provide a numerical result, we use C and Pairing-Based Cryptography (PBC) Library [61] to implement related mathematical operations. The well-known super-singular elliptic curve type-A y 2 = x 3 + x is used to reach the same security level as 1024-bit RSA, the curve group has 160-bit group order, 512-big field size, and the embedding degree of the curve is 2. Our implementation runs on a Personal Computer with intel(R) Core(TM) i3-3220 CPU @ 3.3GHz, VMware 15.0.4, Linux ubuntu 18.04 operating system with 3 GB of RAM. The execution time is computed considering the average of ten succeeding run with different inputs. Table 2 displays the  TABLE 3 . Notations and benchmark. execution time of different mathematical operations used in the schemes discussed. It is important to note that we only consider expensive operations. We analysis the computational complexity of schemes [44] , [50] , [55] , [58] , and our scheme. The comparison results are shown in Table 4 .
For Signcryption Algorithm, e.g., Sun and Li [51] needs n bilinear pairing operations, 2n point multiplications, and n exponentiation after pairing, Islam et al. [45] requires (2n+1) point multiplications and 2n additions on ECC, Niu et al. [55] needs (n + 2) point multiplications, 2n bilinear pairing operations and 2n exponentiation after pairing, whereas our scheme only needs (n+2) point multiplication and n addition on ECC, which is lower than most schemes listed in TABLE 4 , and is about the same as the schemes [46] , [50] . Nevertheless, for Designcryption/decryption Algorithm, the SM-IoT receiver in our scheme only requires one point multiplication on ECC, which is lower than schemes [46] , [50] . As can be seen from the TABLE 4, the efficiency of our scheme is relatively improved in both sender and receiver sides.
To show the results intuitively, we present the execution time of Signcryption Algorithm of schemes [44] , [50] , [55] , [58] in Fig. 2 , and the execution time of Designcryption/decryption Algorithm at SM-IoT receiver side in Fig. 3 , which are based on the execution time implemented with Pairing-Based Cryptography (PBC) Library. From the Fig. 2 , we can see that the signcryption computational time of our scheme is the same as the scheme proposed by Pang et al. [50] , which is more efficient than other compared schemes. The Fig. 3 shows that our scheme has the lowest calculation time in the receiver side. In the light of Table 4 , Fig. 2, and Fig. 3 , we can draw the conclusion that our scheme has less calculation time in both sender and receiver sides. VOLUME 7, 2019 
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed a signcryption scheme for SM-IoT, to achieve secure and efficient multi-message and multi-receiver communication from senders of IBC system to receivers of CLC system. We hide the partial private key during the key generation phase of the traditional CLC system, which means SM-IoT receivers and the KGC no longer need wireless secure channel to transmit their partial private keys. The proposed scheme is constructed based on ECC which has higher efficiency, and do not employ bilinear pairing and exponentiation operations. Besides, our scheme outsourced part of computational overhead to the gateway, so as to minimize the computation costs of the SM-IoT receivers. And the designated receivers can verify signature and outsourced result securely. Therefore, on the whole, our scheme has less computational complexity and higher efficiency compared with the schemes proposed before in both sender side and receiver side. Therefore, it is more suitable for the heterogeneous SM-IoT environment. For further research in our work, we will consider aggregate signcryption schemes between IBC and CLC, to achieve efficient mutual multicommunication in the heterogeneous SM-IoT.
